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Abstract This paper uses structure-mapping to bridge the divide between the analyti-
cal and visual culture traditions of image interpretation. Wittgenstein’s analytic ‘picture 
theory of meaning’ from his early period, and his cultural theory of ‘meaning as use’ 
from his later period are used to show that the terms similarity, analogy and metaphor 
can be applied to both image and linguistic interpretation. As a result, by the mapping 
of similarity and analogy onto the analytic approach, and by the mapping of metaphor 
onto the visual culture approach, a common linguistic ground for the comparison of 
these two approaches to image interpretation can be established.
Keywords Analogy. Metaphor. Similarity. Projection. Meaning. Representation. Map-
ping. Structure. Explanation. Description.
Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 The Early Period and Picturing. – 2.1 Logical 
Pictures. – 2.2 The Limits of Picturing. – 3 The Later Period and Seeing-as. – 3.1 The 
Relationship of the Analytical and Cultural Contexts. – 3.2 The Relationship of Analogy 
and Metaphor. – 4 Conclusions: Bridging the Apparent Incommensurability.
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1 Introduction
Wittgenstein was brought up in an aesthetically educated household. 
His father was a patron of the Vienna Secessionists and Brahms was 
a frequent visitor to the house. His sister Margarete’s wedding por-
trait was by Klimt.1 Against this background of privilege in pre-First 
World War Vienna, and with specific training in engineering draw-
ing and experience of architectural design with Engelmann, it is not 
surprising that Wittgenstein had a high awareness of visual culture. 
Some of his comments on drawing, painting and visual representation 
reflect this cultural education and there are passages in the middle 
and late period works where the act of drawing is a starting point for 
understanding representation in language, e.g. The Blue and Brown 
Books [BBB] (1969), Philosophical Grammar [PG] (1974) and Philosoph-
ical Investigations [PI] (1953).
Wittgenstein does not have an explicit theory of visual represen-
tation. This is despite the so-called ‘picture theory of meaning’ in his 
early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [TLP] (1961 [1922]) which, 
as discussed below, is not a theory of pictorial representation. Indeed, 
the majority of the mention and use of visual representations occurs 
in the later philosophy in which it is frequently claimed that explic-
it theories are avoided. However, Wittgenstein does make a number 
of remarks relevant to visual representation. These remarks cover 
the act of representation itself, its relationship to thinking and our 
grammar of thought, and the ways in which we interpret and act up-
on images. It is also characteristic of the later period that the spur 
to philosophize often comes from language associated with visual 
experience.
The so-called picture theory of meaning in TLP has been widely 
accepted in the analytic tradition as a comparison between the way 
in which an engineering drawing is derived by means of projection 
from the object, and the way in which language and/or thought is de-
rived from the world around us. Recent research into the intellectu-
al history of graphical representation has shown that in addition to 
this kind of drawing, other forms of graphical representation were 
gaining in importance during the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury. Section 2 of this paper uses graphical statics and dynamical 
modelling to argue that Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning is 
not based on a relationship of iconic similarity, but on the contrary 
seeks a linguistic mode of representation by analogy, in which per-
formance and action can be calculated by extending the number of 
1 Gustav Klimt, Margaret Stonborough-Wittgenstein, 1905, Bayerische Staatsgemälde-
sammlungen – Neue Pinakothek, München. https://www.sammlung.pinakothek.de/
en/artwork/8MLvMXyxz3.
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dimensions beyond the basic three of visual experience. In Section 
3, this linguistic interpretation of picturing is extended into meta-
phor by breaking the direct relationship of analogy between the rep-
resentation and what is represented, in favour of the cultural inter-
pretation of his later period. In Section 4 this linguistic account of 
the continuity of Wittgenstein’s representational investigations, from 
similarity through analogy to metaphor, is used to reveal how the 
apparent incommensurability of the analytic and visual cultural ap-
proaches to image interpretation might be bridged.
2 The Early Period and Picturing
Although TLP is a difficult book, it is fairly easy to understand the 
visual analogy of the picture theory of meaning. It appears to de-
rive from the way a drawing is constructed in descriptive geometry 
or engineering using lines of projection that map one onto the oth-
er, and makes the analogy that language has a similar relationship 
to the world that it describes. One reason why one can call this an 
analogy, a term that Wittgenstein does not himself use to describe 
this relationship in TLP,2 is because the concept has a four-term 
structure (Biggs 1992, 4 f.).
The possibility of an analogous representation has its base in an 
isomorphism (Wittgenstein also uses the term “logical multiplicity”, 
§ 4.04), which ensures that aspects of the object can be mapped on-
to aspects of the representation, and vice versa. But Wittgenstein 
wants to do more than visually depict reality. Bearing in mind the fi-
nal topics of TLP § 6, if the method of representation could be suffi-
ciently abstracted, one might be able to make calculations and judge-
ments about ethics, etc. Such a requirement to calculate rather than 
to depict, transforms the focus of the method from visual representa-
tions such as descriptive geometry and engineering drawing, to logi-
cal representations such as graphical statics and dynamical models.
In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common with 
what it pictures. […] What the picture must have in common with 
reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner – right-
ly or falsely – is its form of representation. The picture can rep-
resent every reality whose form it has. The spatial picture, eve-
rything spatial, the coloured, everything coloured, etc. […] What 
every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with real-
ity in order to be able to represent it at all – rightly or falsely – is 
2 However, he does use it several times in the antecedent Notebooks 1914-1916 (38, 
99, 113) and elsewhere. 
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the logical form, that is, the form of reality. If the form of repre-
sentation is the logical form, then the picture is called a logical 
picture. Every picture is also a logical picture. (On the other hand, 
for example, not every picture is spatial). The logical picture can 
depict the world. The picture has the logical form of representa-
tion in common with what it pictures. (TLP §§ 2.16-2.2)
2.1 Logical Pictures
One can regard the concept of dimension in a number of different 
ways, and to understand Wittgenstein it is useful to adopt the math-
ematical concept of dimension rather than the spatial one. The math-
ematical concept is that there is one dimension per quality to be 
recorded; thus if one records the three-dimensional position of an 
object and additionally records its colour, one needs four dimensions. 
If one also records its material it would add a fifth dimension, etc. 
This is not the everyday use of the word dimension, which starts with 
length, width and breadth, and adds time as a possible fourth dimen-
sion, but seems to make further dimensions ‘inconceivable’. The eve-
ryday concept therefore includes an implicit visualisation which lim-
its the number of dimensions to those of everyday experience. The 
mathematical dimensionality of a representation allows one to record 
qualities and to satisfy Wittgenstein’s principal objective to be able 
to ‘reconstruct the object’.3 This reconstructive purpose is empha-
sised in his examples in TLP which are not just restricted to three-
dimensional objects, for example the gramophone record allows us 
to reconstruct the sound of a piece of music by decoding it. 
There is a general rule by means of which the musician can ob-
tain the symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to 
derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record, 
and, using the first rule, to derive the score again. That is what 
constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem 
to be constructed in such entirely different ways. And that rule 
is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the lan-
guage of musical notation. It is the rule for translating this lan-
guage into the language of gramophone records. The possibility of 
all imagery, of all our pictorial modes of expression, is contained 
in the logic of depiction. (TLP §§ 4.0141-4.015)
3 This allows for non-visual ‘pictures’, an apparent paradox that can be dealt with by 
noting that the original German word ‘Bild’ includes the concepts of model and sche-
ma as well as picture.
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The coding and decoding processes are mirror images of one anoth-
er, but even though the analogue gramophone record has sufficient 
dimensional richness to be a logical picture of the music, it does not 
include an image of what the orchestra looked like when they were 
playing the music. Thus DVDs have a greater logical multiplicity or 
mathematical dimensionality than gramophone records. Digital tech-
niques make it easy to record very large amounts of information 
about an object but they have a non-visual picturing relationship to 
what they represent or encode. When one is recording an event one 
must decide what it is that one wishes to record and therefore the 
number of dimensions and therefore the medium that is required. 
This was reflected in the Bergen project to digitise Wittgenstein’s 
Nachlass.4 The project began with facsimiles of Wittgenstein’s hand-
written manuscripts etc. and a decision had to be made about what 
was important to record. Naturally, the orthographic types (writ-
ten letters and words) were of prime importance, but how important 
were spelling mistakes; what about the graphologist who attributes 
meaning to the shape of individual letter forms? What about the line 
breaks and page breaks? Each logical ‘dimension’ of the original de-
mands a dimension in the representation.
Wittgenstein’s paradigm is the ability to reconstruct an object from 
its representation, to reconstruct a thought from a sentence, etc. This 
representational relationship appears to derive from classical mechan-
ics: three-dimensional objects in three-dimensional space in mechan-
ical relationships to one another, but Wittgenstein’s mention of both 
Hertz and Boltzmann in TLP provides the clue to an alternative role of 
models as ways of thinking about the world rather than as depictions 
of the world. Graphical statics and dynamical models enable one to in-
fer the performance of real objects such as the behaviour of propellers 
from vector diagrams or scale models. These techniques were very im-
portant at the time that Wittgenstein studied engineering (1906-11) 
because they were being used to design the first flying machines.5 Al-
though there is sometimes a visual or iconic aspect to these drawings, 
they are principally a method of representing invisible forces using 
vectors. They are therefore at best a schematic representation of what 
the object might look like, and the notion of representation is principal-
ly one of function rather than appearance. Stenius, in his commentary 
on TLP, calls these “unnaturalistic pictures” (1960, 113).
Hamilton (2001) discusses various modes of engineering repre-
sentation in Wittgenstein’s works, including descriptive geometry, 
4 http://wab.uib.no/index.page.
5 The aeronautical pioneer Henri Coanda studied at Technische Hochschule Berlin-
Charlottenburg at the same time as Wittgenstein. Both Coanda and Wittgenstein went 
on to design innovative air-reactive (jet) propulsion systems.
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graphical statics and dynamical models. However, the title ‘Witt-
genstein and the Mind’s Eye’ seems unfortunate because the mind’s 
eye is something explicitly rejected by Wittgenstein in the later Blue 
Book (1969, 4). This common interpretation of TLP is described by 
Stenius as a “misunderstanding” (1960, 113). Sterrett (2002), recog-
nising the role of performance models, preferred Hamilton’s expres-
sion “engineering mind set” (2001, 73). However, the concepts of the 
mind’s eye or a mindset are unnecessary for the argument of the pre-
sent paper, which rejects Hamilton’s emphasis on representation as 
the description of appearance (e.g. 2001, 53, 88) in favour of the de-
scription of performance. What is significant is not that through lan-
guage or another form of representation we are able to perform the 
practical manipulation of the world, but the very possibility of that 
manipulation. So here one may see a symptom of the change of inter-
est from Wittgenstein’s applied studies in engineering to mathemat-
ics and the foundations of mathematics, which took him away from 
engineering to work on logical problems with Russell in 1911. TLP, 
which was written around 1918, reflects the idea that representation 
is more to do with possibility and functionality than physical appear-
ance. In particular, to employ terminology from Wittgenstein’s later 
work, when we move to an alternative form of notation, certain as-
pects become “perspicuous” (PI-I § 122).
There are, however, limitations to what can be recorded in any par-
ticular notation. Although Wittgenstein was seeking a perfect lan-
guage, he was not seeking one with universal application but rath-
er one that avoided being misleading. Thus when Hamilton refers to 
Wittgenstein’s preference for “palpable, graphic forms of representa-
tion” (2001, 56 reporting Schulte), Wittgenstein’s preference should 
be interpreted not as focussing on the merits of the graphical, but 
on the merits of the perspicuous. This paper’s analysis of TLP re-
veals that different forms of graphical notation, and other forms of 
notation such as truth-tables and symbolic logic, each have the ca-
pability of rendering certain dimensions more clearly than others. 
Wittgenstein’s training did not so much indoctrinate him to graphi-
cal rather than non-graphical methods, as raise his awareness of the 
influence that notational systems as a whole have on our concepts 
and reasoning.
2.2 The Limits of Picturing
The explicit comparison between visual representation and repre-
sentation in language is a feature of the later period but not of the 
earlier. Although the later work begins with visual examples of pro-
jection drawing, the examples are used to question whether this one-
to-one relationship holds good. When discussions of visual experi-
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ence are advanced in the later period it is normally to combat the 
idea that when we are thinking or intending there is a picture before 
our minds. Particularly targeted is the idea of some kind of primacy 
such a picture might have because of its ‘direct’ association with the 
thought by means of the earlier projection relationship. Thus when 
Wittgenstein says, “The picture shows me a cube” (PG, 165), the em-
phasis is on the immediate object of experience. If one takes this im-
age as a representation – in this case a cube – one uses the image in 
a particular way. “If the picture tells me something in this sense, it 
tells me words” (PG, 164). To interpret the figure as a cube involves 
reacting to the figure in a particular way which is as culturally de-
termined as the association between the word ‘cube’ and the three-
dimensional figure. This visual culture interpretation is in contrast 
with the analytical relationship of TLP because the cultural inter-
pretation of a figure is discretionary. In TLP the picturing relation-
ship is obligatory because a picture will embody the logical form of 
its object, “the spatial picture [can represent] everything spatial” 
(TLP § 2.171). What is not anticipated in TLP, in terms of visual rep-
resentation, is that a spatial picture may be taken for a representa-
tion of some other object or form according to a convention or with-
in a particular language-game. This change in the later period shifts 
his visually-led interpretation from something embodied in the rep-
resentation to something embodied in our practices. It reveals the 
limitations, not of a single representational system, but of any rep-
resentational system.
It is a key concept in TLP that a representation cannot represent 
its own representational form (TLP§ 2.174). To describe a represen-
tational form requires one to step outside it. Thus, if one did not un-
derstand English, no amount of reading the Oxford English Dictionary 
would help. Contrary to Hamilton (2001, 85) the fact that a picture 
cannot depict its representational form is not a problem of what can 
be visualised as opposed to what can be verbalised, but rather what 
can be expressed in a particular form of representation as opposed to 
the representational relationship itself. The latter requires stepping 
outside of the language of the representation in order to describe it. 
If we are talking about the totality of all our forms of representation 
of the world, i.e. thinking, then this process of ‘stepping outside’ be-
comes impossible. One could compare this to the limitation of a par-
ticular paradigm (Kuhn 1996): if the paradigm changes then all sorts 
of ideas become possible that were hitherto impossible or unthinka-
ble. On the other hand, despite any changes of representational form, 
when a paradigm changes the world remains unchanged.6
6 Kuhn links his argument to a starting-point in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investi-
gations in the section “The Priority of Paradigms”, 43-51. 
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The fact that ethics cannot be put into words (TLP § 6.421) is not 
a reference to the possibility that ethics could be put into pictures 
(Hamilton 2001, 85). These are two different modes of representa-
tion: language and pictures, and they can show two different things. 
Pictures are no more able to show their representational form than 
is language (TLP § 4.121). Neither drawing nor language, to the ex-
tent that they represent thinking, can represent the relationship be-
tween thinking and the world, because that requires stepping out-
side thinking. This is the problem that finally broke Wittgenstein’s 
analytic image of a projection model of representation.
3 The Later Period and Seeing-as
In the later period (principally in PI) Wittgenstein’s visual represen-
tations cease to have a projection relationship to their objects. One 
consequence of this change is that his use of images begins to refer 
not only to individuals but also to types, or general and unspecific 
aspects such as a facial expression rather than the specific look on 
a specific person’s face. When looking at such images we see an as-
pect in them; seeing-as a face, a smile, etc.
The first part of PI engages with his principal difficulty which is 
the significance of the representational relationship itself. In projec-
tion drawing the projection ‘explains’ how the image stands in rela-
tion to its object: in linguistic terms, ‘this word means this object’ 
(cf. PI-I § 1). The system of projection (not the projection drawing it-
self) is what gives meaning to the image and gives meaning to the 
word. However, in his later period Wittgenstein claims this compari-
son cannot reliably be mapped onto our use of words. He particularly 
wants to object that meaning is not a third element standing between 
a representation and its object because we cannot, for example, spec-
ify the object of an ostensive definition. The ostensive definition ‘this 
is a red patch’ has as its visual phenomenon, the experience of a red 
patch, not the redness of the red patch. Offering up the sample of a 
red object, during the act of the ostensive definition, is part of the 
definiens and not the definiendum of red. Therefore, unfortunately, 
ostensive definition is not where ‘explanation comes to an end’ ow-
ing to it being fundamental, as is the case with simple ideas in TLP: 
explanation comes to an end because we cannot express the direct 
visual experience in the indirect language-game.
This sample is an instrument of the language used in ascriptions 
of colour. In this language-game it is not something that is repre-
sented, but is a means of representation (PI-I § 50).
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As a result, Wittgenstein uses images, pictures and picturing in the 
later period in a very different way from their use in early period. 
He can no longer appeal to the structure of analogy to explain the 
picturing relationship because there are no longer four terms in a 
set relationship: p stands to q in a comparable relationship to how r 
stands to s. In the terms of analogy, we no longer know what the re-
lationship between r and s is. Instead, the image stands without ex-
plication and therefore much better compared to the use of meta-
phor rather than analogy. 
As is the case with linguistic metaphor, the underlying relation-
ship of this later picturing is not unpacked and explained. The impli-
cation is that the earlier attempts at unpacking the relationships in 
TLP were futile. In PI the reader must allow the experience of exam-
ples to accrue in their cultural context, in order to intuit from custom 
and use how the community of users intends one thing to ‘mean’ an-
other, and how we learn to ‘see-as’ (PI-II, 210). It shows a shift from 
a prescriptive, analytic visual image theory to a therapeutic, cultur-
al interpretive visual image strategy.
It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use 
of our words in unheard-of ways. For the clarity that we are aiming 
at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philo-
sophical problems should completely disappear. The real discovery 
is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when 
I want to. The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer 
tormented by questions which bring itself in question. Instead, we 
now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples 
can be broken off. Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not 
a single problem. There is not a philosophical method, though there 
are indeed methods, like different therapies (PI-I § 133).
3.1 The Relationship of the Analytical and Cultural Contexts
Our ubiquitous cultural practice of using samples and pictures as rep-
resentations disguises their social origins and encourages the belief 
in a corresponding, analytic association with the thought. The habit 
requires cultural qualification.
Perhaps the following expression would have been better: we re-
gard the photograph, the picture on our wall, as the object itself 
(the man, landscape, and so on) depicted there (PI-II, 205).
The ability to make a conventional association between an image and 
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When I look at a genre-picture, it “tells” me something even though 
I donʼt believe (imagine) for a moment that the people I see in it 
really exist, or that there have really been people in that situa-
tion (PI-I § 522).
In Wittgenstein’s terms, the necessity of identifying the role of a par-
ticular picture within our broader practice – the specific or unspe-
cific reading – must be made perspicuous. Unfortunately, the pos-
sibility of genre-pictures introduces what Wittgenstein might call 
a ‘temptation’ which is to think that this process leads to a gener-
al image or that the genre-picture ‘depicts’ something general, i.e. 
that it has a projection relationship with a generalised object. If one 
sees a genre-picture as an unspecific depiction that does not neces-
sarily imply that what is depicted is unspecific, only that certain as-
pects of the specific depiction are not part of its function as an un-
specific picture. Thus,
there is a tendency rooted in our usual forms of expression, to 
think that the man who has learnt to understand a general term, 
say, the term “leaf”, has thereby come to possess a kind of gener-
al picture of a leaf… one which only contains what is common to 
all leaves (BBB 17 f., cf. Goethe’s Urpflanze).
Another equally erroneous temptation is that each as-yet-uninter-
preted representation carries with it as some kind of cultural bag-
gage of all the objects which the representation might stand for in 
other contexts. This is just the sort of hidden signification which Witt-
genstein is at pains to deny.
Suppose someone said: every familiar word, in a book for exam-
ple, actually carries an atmosphere with it in our minds, a “coro-
na” of lightly indicated uses. Just as if each figure in a painting 
were surrounded by delicate shadowy drawings of scenes, as it 
were in another dimension, and in them we saw the figures in dif-
ferent contexts (PI-II, 181).
The unspecific pictorial image does not have a projection relation-
ship to its object that can be explained by the analytic approach to 
image interpretation. It must be used correctly within the context 
of a language-game that constitutes our visual culture. “For such a 
schema to be understood as a schema… resides in the way the sam-
ples are used” (PI-I § 73). In practice this is determined by the use 
to which the drawing is put, rather than some inherent property of 
the drawing itself. There is therefore no transparent method of pro-
jection, no primacy of one form of projection over another: in other 
words, in the later work the analytic approach to the interpretation 
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of images has been superseded by the visual cultural. The directness 
and indirectness of the visual experience, and our understanding of 
it is reflected in Wittgenstein’s rejection of the assumption that there 
is only one way of interpreting the picture: he complains that “a pic-
ture held us captive” (PI-I § 115); also, “the picture was the key. Or it 
seemed like a key” (Wittgenstein 1981, § 240). Interpretation on the 
basis of mere similarity misses the way in which the picture can act 
within a cultural practice and be seen-as as a type and not as a token.
3.2 The Relationship of Analogy and Metaphor
The claim that Wittgenstein uses images as metaphors (e.g. Wilker-
son 1973; Biggs 1992; Nyiri 2014) draws attention to our ability to 
work abstractly with signs, to use them creatively, but also to cast 
doubt upon the possibility of an analytic, non-metaphorical use of 
signs.
We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not 
find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough (PI-II, 212).
This new difficulty with the previously favoured analytical use of 
signs arises in PI-II because ‘aspect-blindness’ – which in relation 
to the duck-rabbit describes the user responding to it only as a rab-
bit – does not prevent responding to it as a rabbit. True aspect-blind-
ness would prevent seeing the image as depicting anything including 
the rabbit. Therefore the user needs to ‘see the aspect’ that enables 
the projection drawing to be an image by similarity, just as much as 
she needs to ‘see the aspect’ of the duck and the rabbit. Further-
more, one cannot unilaterally extend the use of the sign beyond the 
aspects accepted by the users within a particular visual culture, for 
example, by seeing the duck-rabbit as an elephant.
Acting in a particular way in response to an image shows that some-
one is seeing a sign in a particular way. This does not imply that when 
one draws an image, that one’s intention that it should be seen in this 
or that way somehow lies hidden. Wittgenstein asserts this in his usu-
al, ironic way, expecting us to see the impossibility of the assertion:
We mean the arrow in one way or another. And this process of 
meaning… can be represented by another arrow (pointing in the 
same or opposite sense to the first) (BBB, 33).
Our intention will only be satisfied if someone reacts to our sign in 
the way we wish, and this establishes a cultural context for interpre-
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What has the expression of a rule – say a sign-post – got to do with 
my actions?… I have been trained to react to this sign in a particu-
lar way (PI-I § 198).
This gives a clue to the basic use Wittgenstein finds for visual repre-
sentations in the later period. They function as a therapeutic device 
against the temptation to pursue philosophical investigations in ways 
determined by the structure of a sentence rather than the character-
istics of what it represents. The difference between the two can be 
revealed by a change in the representational form, e.g. by a picture 
instead of a sentence. The benefit of the use of a picture is to provide 
a contrast with the sentence, rather than providing a more accurate 
representation. It is this contrast which gives the utility to Wittgen-
stein’s later use of images.
4 Conclusions: Bridging the Apparent Incommensurability
This paper makes six claims, of which the last is original. First, that 
Wittgenstein’s early model for how we represent the world to our-
selves is based on a type of visual ‘picturing’ exemplified by ortho-
graphic projection engineering drawing. The act of projecting and ex-
plicitly connecting the object to its representation shows that this is 
a relationship of direct correspondence or similarity. Second, that as 
he extends the logical complexity of the relationship to include non-
visual representations such as gramophone records, the visual rela-
tionship of similarity is better replaced by the structural relationship 
of analogy. This second claim marks a shift from a visual paradigm 
to a structural paradigm. Third, that owing to its genealogy in visu-
al representation, this structural relationship of analogy shares fea-
tures with the analytical model of image interpretation. Fourth, that 
in response to the limitations of the method from analogy to account 
for the fundamental connections between a representation and what 
it represents, Wittgenstein abandoned this explanatory model from 
his early period in favour of a descriptive model based on metaphor 
in his later period. Fifth, that once again owing to its genealogy in 
visual representation, this cultural relationship of metaphor to what 
it represents, shares features with the visual culture model of image 
interpretation. Sixth, therefore the relationship between the analyt-
ic and visual culture approaches to image interpretation can be in-
vestigated in terms of the relationship between analogy and metaphor 
in structural linguistics, and as a result the latter can offer a bridge 
between the apparent incommensurability of the analytic and visu-
al culture approaches to image interpretation.
The first three claims about Wittgenstein and representation may 
be summarised as follows. His early model arises in the visual prac-
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tice of engineering drawing but owing to Wittgenstein’s interest in 
the structural possibilities of the model, it is quickly extended from 
the visual into the abstract through a change from an underlying vis-
ual similarity to a structural relationship comparable to linguistic 
analogy. This change allows the model to be applied to non-visual 
representation whilst maintaining the fundamental principle of iso-
morphism. The isomorphic relationship ensures that there is a corre-
spondence between the logical complexity of the representation and 
the logical complexity of the object. As the early period progresses, 
by sophisticating the notion of dimensionality from 2-D drawing, via 
3-D engineering drawing, to the multiple dimensions of mathemat-
ical space, Wittgenstein shows that one can speak meaningfully of 
an analogous picturing relationship beyond what can be merely vis-
ualised. On the other hand, Wittgenstein had to deploy strategies to 
avoid the paradox of using language to speak about the limits of lan-
guage. In his early period this simply meant that “what we cannot 
speak about we must pass over in silence” (TLP § 7).
The fourth and fifth claims about Wittgenstein and representation 
may be summarised as follows. During the transition and into the lat-
er period, Wittgenstein eschewed his increasingly complex defence 
of the relationship of analogy in favour of a metaphorical relation-
ship. By the later period he had changed his approach to the problem 
of how to speak directly about the limits of language, in favour of an 
indirect method: “to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in 
every direction” (PI Preface). Methodologically, the shift to indirect-
ness reveals that by exchanging the analogical, proximal relationship 
of one object to another for the abstract categorization of objects not 
usually juxtaposed, one can speak meaningfully about commonality 
without having to explain how that relationship functions.
The sixth, and principal claim of this paper, is as follows. The lin-
guistic tropes of similarity, analogy and metaphor have been described 
using terms from structure-mapping theory in linguistics. The key dif-
ference between similarity and analogy is that similarity maps many 
attributes but few relationships from the target (about which we seek 
knowledge) to the base (about which we are familiar), whereas anal-
ogy maps few attributes but many relationships. In other words, sim-
ilarity involves superficial similarity whereas an analogy is often all 
the more striking owing to the lack of superficial similarity to the base.
The central idea is that an analogy is an assertion that a relation-
al structure that normally applies in one domain can be applied 
in another domain (Gentner 1983, 156).
Analogy is in this sense closer to metaphor than to similarity, owing 
to them both relying on disjunction, e.g. between the claim of the 
metaphor – for example “Juliet is the sun” – and its literal interpre-
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tation. By this comparison, Wittgenstein’s early period includes two 
related but distinct picture theories of meaning. The first adopts a 
simple iconic model in which both iconicity and spatial picturing are 
used. The second is more dimensionally complex and meets Wittgen-
stein’s description of a logical picture/representation. This shifts the 
linguistic description of the relationship from similarity to analogy 
because the latter relies on the target and base having comparable 
relationships despite having dissimilar appearances.
According to [structure-mapping theory], the contrast between 
analogy and literal similarity is a continuum, not a dichotomy 
(Gentner 1983, 161). 
As a result, it would be in accord with recent scholarship about Witt-
genstein’s early period to avoid using the term ‘picture theory of 
meaning’ – which he himself did not use – in favour of a ‘theory of 
representation by analogy’. However, in his later period he rejects the 
adequacy of such a correspondence relationship owing to the lack of 
both the attribute and the relationship mappings regarding the way 
that images and words function as representations. Continuing the 
appropriation from linguistics, various commentators have described 
the representational relationship in the later period as functioning 
by metaphor. This description applies to his use of both words and 
images. According to structure-mapping theory, metaphor works by 
a process of categorization in which a novel category is established 
that can contain both the target and the base:
the base concept is used to access or derive an abstract metaphor-
ic category of which it represents a prototypical member, and the 
target concept is then assigned to that category. (Bowdle, Gentner 
2005, 195)
The novel abstract category does not rely on a similarity of attributes 
or relationships. It achieves its polysemy by the creative possibility 
of generating multiple categories, and some of that possibility arises 
from the lack of explicit similarity, including any apparent categorial 
similarity. One of the challenges discussed by Bowdle and Gentner 
is how the user chooses between competing potential abstract cate-
gorizations in order to select the most productive one for the inter-
pretation of the metaphor. Wittgenstein’s response would seem to be 
that this is a societal matter resolved by normal usage, commonly ex-
pressed as his concept of ‘language-games’. Wittgenstein’s presumed 
response would be harmonious with visual culture interpretation, in-
deed Barker and Jane claim that cultural studies is constituted by the 
language-game of cultural studies (2016, 4).
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This leads to the final issue of what benefit is gained from the 
above analysis. Wittgenstein’s abiding interest from the early peri-
od to the later period was in the relationship between language and 
the world. His use of images throughout his lifetime was always to 
illustrate what he thought was the nature of this relationship. In his 
later period he abandoned the so-called ‘picture theory of meaning’ 
in favour of a culturally focussed account of the connection between 
language and meaning. This is supposed to stem from the day when 
his colleague Sraffa passed him by on a bicycle and made a rude ges-
ture at him (Malcolm 1958, 69). Wittgenstein realised that the mean-
ing of this gesture was culturally determined, and this extended to 
the meaning of words in general. This has become known as ‘mean-
ing as use’ and occurs in a cultural context that Wittgenstein called 
‘language-games’, i.e. cultural practices. The interpretation of that 
gesture, and of words and images in general, may be compared to 
the linguistic practice of metaphor, in which two disparate terms are 
juxtaposed and this disjunction provides rhetorical impact. The dis-
junction also serves to cue, break or prevent the literal interpreta-
tion of the words in favour of an indirect meaning. When we are pre-
sented with an image we understand, owing to this cultural context, 
that we are supposed to see beyond the objectivity of the colours on 
paper and to ‘see-as’ an image what is apparently merely an object. 
Such implicit, culturally inferred meanings are, according to struc-
ture-mapping theory, mediated by an indirect object of a different 
category than the base and target terms. The metaphor is polysemous 
and so the optimum meaning must be negotiated by the users as part 
of a cultural practice. There is, therefore, a continuity in the repre-
sentational relationship between the analytic and visual culture ap-
proaches to image interpretation that can be investigated in terms 
of the relationship between analogy and metaphor in structural lin-
guistics, and as a result this method can offer a bridge between the 
apparent incommensurability of the analytic and visual culture ap-
proaches to image interpretation.
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